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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/05/2006 Accident number: 132 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 25/12/1997 
Where it occurred: Abas Abad, Kandahar 
city 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: building rubble 
residential/urban 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
standing to excavate (?) 





At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available. The 
following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for one year. It was one month since he had last attended a 
revision course and 39 days since his last leave. The victim was working in a residential area 
clearing the spoil from a back-hoe operation.  
The investigators determined that the victim was investigating a reading in a pile of soil 
deposited by the back-hoe when the mine went off. The investigators reported that the victim 
claimed to have been using a bayonet but that his lack of injury made them think this unlikely. 
The Team Leader said the victim was working properly and that the back-hoe spoil was not 
broken up and very hard, so the accident was unavoidable. 
 
The picture shows a deminer working through back-hoe spoil in Kandahar in 1998. Note his 
working position, which was raised fully onto his knees as soon as I put the camera away. 
The victim's partner said that the deminer was working properly but must have used too 
much pressure on his bayonet/prodder. 
The victim said he was working properly until he made the mistake of prodding too deep. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the victim was using a long handled shovel to investigate the 
reading, which should not be done. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that deminers must not use long handled shovels to 
excavate detector readings, that the team command group should supervise more closely, 




Victim number: 168 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: not recorded 
 





See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The accident report summarised the victim's injuries as mild head trauma, temporary shock 
and a headache for several days. 
The insurers were informed on 2nd January 1998 that the victim had received a mild head 
trauma and deafness.  
The demining group submitted a claim on 6th April 1998 on behalf of the victim, saying he had 
been off work until 15th January 1998. Another claim submitted on 23rd April 1998 recorded 
that the victim was passed fit to resume his duties on 6th April 1998. 
No record of compensation was found in June 1998.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the 
inconsistent statements imply that supervisors felt they had something to conceal. The 
inconsistencies in their statements imply that some were lying, and the UN MAC's failure to 
address the problem of dishonesty among field supervisors represents a management failing. 
It is ironic that the investigators were reluctant to believe that the victim was using a bayonet 
because his injuries were so light. They obviously recognise that had he been using a 
bayonet it is very likely that his hand injury would have been severe, yet they still accept the 
management's choice of a short AK bayonet as a suitable excavation tool.  
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because a shovel was used as an 
excavation tool. 
The use of the shovel and an upright position to "excavate" were both in breach of UN 
requirements, but not in breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those 
requirements. The failure of the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt SOPs for 
local conditions, or enforce their own standards may be seen as another management failing. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
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was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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